Abstract-We propose an algorithmic approach to the problem of verification of the property of intransitive noninterference (INI), using tools and concepts of discrete event systems (DES). INI can be used to characterize and solve several important security problems in multilevel security systems. In a previous work, we have established the notion of -observability, which precisely captures the property of INI. We have also developed an algorithm for checking -observability by indirectly checking -observability for systems with at most three security levels. In this paper, we generalize the results for systems with any finite number of security levels by developing a direct method for checking -observability, based on an insightful observation that the function is a left congruence in terms of relations on formal languages. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, we propose a formal method to detect denial of service vulnerabilities in security protocols based on INI. This method is illustrated using the TCP/IP protocol. The work extends the theory of supervisory control of DES to a new application domain.
For this purpose, the first task is to define the notion of information flow in DES. This notion plays a central role for security specification. It roughly intends to quantify the correlation between unobservable or private strings and the way they are observed by a public observer. Also, unlike in the supervisory control of DES, where the observation of a string can be captured by a simple projection to purge unobservable events, information flow is much more complex in our problem. To illustrate this, let us consider a simple example of a cryptosystem with two security levels: a private or high level ( ) and a public or low level ( ). Suppose we attach a security level to each event say, to and to , then, in the automaton , there is an information flow from to because any public observer of the event has the possibility to know whether occurred or not. The reason is that there is some causal dependency from the private event action to the public event . Such a dependency creates an insecure channel called covert channel. Noninterference requires that no such causal dependency from to exists. The automaton satisfies noninterference. In practice, however, many security problems go beyond the scope of simple noninterference. In particular, confidentiality in multilevel security systems, where the relation over the set of security levels capturing allowed information flows, is not transitive. Let us consider now as a more intricate example, a cryptosystem with three security levels: a private or high level ( ), a public or low level ( ), and a downgrading level ( ). In this system, information is not allowed to flow from the high level to the low level, unless it has been previously downgraded (encrypted) through the cryptosystem. As in the previous example, suppose we attach a security level to each event say, to , to and to , then, in this case, the information flow in the automaton is allowed. Intransitive noninterference (INI) captures the allowed information flow from the high level to the low level through the downgrading level.
In general, the properties of noninterference and intransitive noninterference are much more complex than what are shown by the above two examples. They must be specified by using purge functions to capture information inferred by a public observer. Since their introduction [15] , these properties have been widely used to formulate various security problems [1] , [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , [9] , [14] [15] [16] . In the above two simple examples, it is intuitively easy to check if noninterference or intransitive noninterference is satisfied. However, for large systems that contains hundreds of states and events and many security levels, it is not an easy task to check noninterference or intransitive noninterference. In fact, prior to our work, no algorithm based on a necessary and sufficient condition for checking INI has been obtained.
In a previous work [2] , we have developed an algorithmic approach to the verification of intransitive noninterference. We first precisely characterized INI through a new definition of observability with respect to the purge function ( -observability). Then we converted -observability into observability with respect to some projection ( -observability), as used in supervisory control problems. The approach is indirect because we do not check -observability directly. This approach is simple but can only be used for systems with at most three security levels and cannot be generalized for systems with more than three security levels. In this paper, we develop a direct approach for checking -observability. Our approach works for systems with any finite number of security levels, where admissible information flow is specified by a so called security policy, i.e., a security lattice [15] describing admissible information flow among the security levels. Based on an insightful observation that -purge is a left congruence in terms of relations on formal languages, we borrow some techniques from supervisory control of DES and work on strings in reverse to solve an otherwise difficult problem of verifying -observability and, hence, INI. Intuitively, the left congruence just reflects the fact that we should only delete those private events that are not followed by some downgrading events.
In the second part of this paper, we apply our theoretical results to the problem of checking robustness to denial of service (DoS) attacks. In recent years, several Internet sites have been subjected to DoS attacks. One of the most famous DoS attacks is the SYN flooding attack [18] on the TCP/IP protocol. Since 1996, this resource exhaustion attack has been launched at several occasions by intruders having the capabilities to initiate, with little effort, a large number of protocol runs. DoS attacks have been perpetrated on Internet e-commerce sites, including Yahoo, Ebay, and E*trade in February 2000 and Microsoft in January 2001. In network DoS attacks on protocols which establish authenticated communication channels, the identity of the intruder is generally unknown because authentication has not yet been completed.
One way to prevent such attacks is the use of a sequence of authentication mechanisms, arranged in order of increasing cost (to both parties) and increasing security. With this approach, an intruder must be willing to complete the earlier stages of the protocol before he can force a system to spend resources running the later stages of the protocol. Meadows recently proposed a formal cost-based framework for the analysis of denial of service [11] . The results show how to formalize this principle to make cryptographic protocols more resistant to denial of service by comparing the cost to the defender against the cost to the attacker. Although an intruder is capable to break some of the (weak) authentication steps of a protocol, it will cost him a dissuading effort. Lafrance and Mullins [9] introduced a formal method based on information flow in process algebra for detecting violation of the design principle formalized by Meadows. This paper describes this method in the framework of DES. The basic idea behind the method is to prove that no intruder can use the protocol to interfere with costly actions of the defender, in order to cause resource exhaustion DoS. Using the INI property to capture this interference, we, therefore, obtain a complete proof technique that allows us to detect whenever an intruder may use a protocol to send, with little effort, a fake message in order to provoke costly actions like resource allocation, decryption or signature verification. Such a flaw could be exploited by an intruder in order to launch a DoS attack by wasting the defender's valuable resources. More specifically, we define a robustness against DoS, a property that verifies whether the behavior of a principal (e.g., server) differs when we introduce an intruder within the protocol. Roughly speaking, if the principal behaves differently when it is being attacked, then we conclude that the protocol design is not compliant with the Meadow's security design principle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the necessary background on automata, languages, and multilevel security, and characterizes intransitive INI in terms of -observability with respect to a purge function (within the context of a given system automata describing the interactions of all security levels). Section III develops the algorithm for the verification of INI. In Section IV, we propose a framework for the specification of security protocols in terms of DES, along with a formal method based on INI for the detection of denial of service vulnerabilities. We also offer a complete application of our method to the analysis of the transmission control protocol (TCP).
II. BASIC CONCEPTS AND BACKGROUND
This section is divided into two subsections. The first gives the needed background on DES and languages. The second introduces the necessary concepts from security; in particular, it defines the notion of a purge function, INI, and -observability.
A. Automata and Languages
In this paper, we model a multilevel security system by an automaton (also called generator or state machine)
where denotes the set of events and the state space, the transition function, the initial state, and the set of marked states. The (partial) transition function describes the system dynamics: given states and event , if the execution of from state takes the system to state . Note that is undefined whenever the event cannot be executed from the state . The behavior of the security system is described by the language generated by and the language marked by . The language generated by is defined as is defined Each trace in represents a possible execution of the system. The language marked by is a subset of traces in that also end in a marked state
In this paper, we will also use nondeterministic automata with -transitions ( denotes the empty string) and several initial states where is the nondeterministic transition function; and is the set of initial states. The language generated by is defined as follows:
is defined that is, if, and only if, is possible from one of the initial states of . The language marked by is defined as follows:
that is, if, and only if, can take the automaton from one of its initial states to one of its marked states. It is well known that a nondeterministic automaton can always be converted to a deterministic automaton that marks the same language (this is obviously preserved for the case of the automata with multiple initial states, that we are defining here). For the sake of convenience, we often view (or ) as the set of all possible transitions for some and Automata and languages play an important role in our approach. Therefore, let us briefly recall some results in automata and language theory.
For a deterministic or a nondeterministic automaton we denote the set of states that are reachable from some initial states and co-reachable to some marked states as . The operator removes the states that are not in where denotes the transition function restricted to . Clearly, (but, in general, ). Another operator that will be used in our approach is the following parallel composition of two deterministic automata and , which describes the joint behavior of and and is defined as
It is clear from the above definition that if , then and .
An equivalence relation is called a right congruence, if
For example, give an automata , define an equivalence relation as Then, is a right congruence. In fact, for any right congruence, , we can construct an automata such that is equal to . For the problem studied in this paper, the intransitive noninterference property is introduced through a purge function which is not right congruence. Hence, we need to introduce left congruence as follows. An equivalence relation is called a left congruence if Unfortunately, for a left-congruence , we cannot always construct an automata such that is equal to . To overcome this difficulty, we consider strings in reverse. Let the reversed string of Clearly, we have Definition 1: For an equivalence relation , define a "reversed" equivalence relation as follows: For all
The following lemma describes the relation between right congruence and left congruence and will be used to derive our main results.
Lemma 1: If is a left congruence, then is a right congruence.
Proof: Assume that is a left congruence, that is Then, for all
B. Intransitive Noninterference in Multilevel Systems
To formally define INI, let us consider a set of security domains, a set of events partitioned over these domains, de-scribed by the mapping , and an interference relation,
. The domains represent the security levels or channels for which we will define noninterference requirements. The mapping is used to describe the event partition: For every , the set specifies the events associated with . The relation defines a security lattice: For domains , , the intended meaning of is to allow the domain to interfere with the domain . We assume that our system, i.e., the combined behavior associated with all the domains, is modeled by a language , generated by a finite automata To formally define INI, a function on traces called intransitive purge, denoted , is introduced by Rushby [15] .
is defined using given in the equation shown at the bottom of the page. Intuitively, captures the set of domains which are allowed to interfere throughout the execution of a trace.
is then defined as follows:
and if otherwise .
Intuitively, is a string reduction function such that, consists of the substring obtained from by removing every event belonging to any domain that should not interfere with the domain .
INI can then be defined as follows, which is essentially the definition of Rushby [15] .
Definition 2 (Intransitive Noninterference): A language satisfies INI if
It was proved in a previous paper [2] that the problem of verifying INI in a multilevel system can be reduced to the problem of checking -observability. 
III. CHECKING -OBSERVABILITY
In this section, we develop a direct approach to verifying INI by checking -observability. Note that the verification of INI in accordance to the given security lattice, reduces to checking -observability with respect to each domain in this lattice. To this end, let us fix a domain and denote by . For the problem studied in this paper, ; therefore, -observability can be rewritten as Given , , and , the first phase of our approach, before checking -observability, consists of constructing an automata that marks the purged language of defined as follows:
Since -induced equivalence is left congruent, the construction of is rather involved: First, we need to construct an automaton for the reversed langauge . Second, we need to introduce, in this automaton, information from the security lattice and then apply to obtain an automaton for . Last, we need to reverse the automaton for in order to obtain . The second phase of our approach consists of checking -observability using . First, we establish a correspondence between states in and states in ; this defines a notion of equivalence on the states of . Second, we check the consistency of -equivalent states of , with respect to -observability. We start the presentation of the above approach by defining the following equivalence relation on traces:
It is easy to see, from the definition of , that is a left congruence. By Lemma 1, is a right congruence. Therefore, to construct an automaton for , we need to work on reversed languages.
Step1 Our verification approach is given by the following algorithm, which summarizes the steps and procedures described above.
Algorithm 1. Given ,
, and with . We verify that satisfies INI, by sequentially applying the following two procedures for every domain .
• PROCEDURE A Construct the automaton as follows.
-Construct marking , according to Step 1 given above.
-Construct by adding domain information to , according to Step 2 given above. Fig. 1 . Automaton G.
-Construct marking , by changing some transition in into -transitions, according to Step 3 given above.
-Construct marking , by reversing , according to Step 4 given above.
-Construct by trimming , according to Step 5 given above.
-Construct as a deterministic version of , according to Step 6 given above.
• PROCEDURE B Check that is -observable w.r.t.
as follows. -Construct the function , as defined above. This step essentially labels all the components of the form of any states in the state space of . -According to Theorem 2, check the consistency, with respect to any event, of any states of that are in labeled components of any one state in .
The following example gives an application of the above algorithm.
Example 1: Consider the three domain lattice, with . The system is modeled by the automata given in Fig. 1 , where , and . Clearly in this case to verify INI, we only need to check -observability with respect to .
We start by applying the steps of PROCEDURE A of Algorithm 1.
-We construct from the automaton marking . This automaton is not shown since it can be easily deduced from . -We construct the automaton , shown in Fig. 2 , by expanding and adding domain information to its states. Note that also marks . -We construct from the nondeterministic automaton , shown in Fig. 3 , marking . Only one transition becomes , since it enters a state on an event from a domain not in the source of the entered state. -By reversing the automaton , we obtain , shown in Fig. 4 , marking . -The automaton remains unchanged with the application of the operator; hence, . -The automaton , shown in Fig. 5 , is a deterministic version of .
Next, we apply the steps of PROCEDURE B of Algorithm 1. -In particular, note that , where is the second state from the left in Fig. 5 .
-Now note that the event is possible after in but not possible after . Hence, according to the theorem 2, is not -observable with respect to .
In conclusion of this example, we can say that, according to Theorem 1, the system of Fig. 1 
does not satisfy INI.
A Complexity Note: We note that Algorithm 1 is of exponential complexity. There are two major contributions to this complexity: 1) In Step 2 of PROCEDURE A, the state space of the automaton is expanded to include domain information; though, the complexity of this step is , it should be noted that the number of domains for most practical problems is small. 2) In Step 6 of PROCEDURE A, the automaton is converted into a deterministic automaton, with a complexity of ; in fact, this also coincides with the worst-case complexity of the entire algorithm.
IV. DETECTION OF DENIAL OF SERVICE VULNERABILITIES IN SECURITY PROTOCOLS
In this section, we show how to use the results of Section III to analyze security protocols. First, we specify a protocol, based on the method proposed by Lafrance and Mullins [9] . Second, we investigate the robustness of this protocol against DoS, using INI.
In a DoS attack an intruder causes resource exhaustion to a defender (e.g., server) through the steps of a protocol (most commonly an authentication protocol). In such an attack, at any step of the protocol (but typically at the beginning), the intruder sends a fake message that requires little effort to forge, but causes a great waste of resources to the defender. If the defender may simultaneously process several requests (protocol runs), the intruder can then repeat this attack up to the point of exhausting all defender resources.
A. Specification of Security Protocols
We describe the behavior of a participant (principal) , involved in a run of the protocol , with a generator:
. The event set of the principal is partitioned as , where denotes the private events, and denotes the synchronization events, i.e., the events used by to communicate with other principals.
Given the specification of each principal involved in one or more runs of the protocol , the whole protocol is given as the parallel composition of all these specifications.
Consider a protocol composed of two participants, Alice ( ) and Bob ( ), then can be specified with the generator:
. An intruder is simply specified as another principal, with its own generator . The protocol being attacked by the intruder is, therefore, specified by the generator:
. Example 2 (TCP): The TCP provides a reliable connectionoriented data stream delivery service for applications. A TCP connection commonly uses memory structures to hold data related to the local end of the communication link, i.e., the TCP state, the IP address, the port number, the timers, the sequence number, the flow control status, etc. (a full description is given by Schuba et al. [18] .)
Before starting the transmission of data between a source principal and a destination principal , TCP uses a connection establishment protocol called the three-way handshake Message Message Message First, initiates the connection by sending a synchronization packet , containing a fresh sequence number along with the IP addresses of and . Next, acknowledges using along with a new synchronization packet . Finally, acknowledges 's using . and specifications are given in Figs. 6 and 7. The important events are as follows:
• [18] . Since 1996, this resource exhaustion attack has been launched at several occasions by intruders having the capabilities to initiate, with little effort, a large number of protocol runs. This resource exhaustion attack is possible due to the following: The intruder generates a fake IP address and creates using this fake IP address. The intruder then simply sends the fake to the server , who processes it as follows: first, the server allocates data structures in which packet is stored; second, the server creates for ; third, the server creates a new ; last, the server sends and to the IP address given by the intruder. The intruder then repeats this attacks with different fake IP addresses and different , but without completing any protocol run. This attack is feasible because generating fake IP addresses and SYN packets require little effort! Resource exhaustion occurs because the server allocates expensive data structures upon receiving a SYN packet. The specification of an intruder , engaging and achieving a SYN flooding attack is given in Fig. 8 . The following events are used:
• 's events: -: creation of , using own IP address, 's IP address and some random number , hence, behaving honestly (private event); -: sending correct (synchronization event); -: receiving and (synchronization event); -: verification that matches and creation of (private event); -: sending correct (synchronization event); -
•: creation of using fake IP address (private event); -: sending fake , hence, launching attack (synchronization event). The synchronization events and within 's automaton (Fig. 7) are related to the attack launched by , and their meaning can easily deduced from the explanations already given.
The automaton specifying the SYN flooding attack on the TCP protocol is illustrated in Fig. 9 .
B. Specification of Robustness Against Denial of Service
For every principal (that is not taken as an intruder), we assume that its set of private events is composed of two types, regular and costly, hence, . The costly events are defined in terms of the principal's memory or CPU capacities. For an intruder , we consider a subset of its events as representing 's admissible attacks. Consider the following set of domains, . Note that represents the regular events of that are not admissible, and represents the synchronization events of all principals other . Now, we introduce robustness against DoS, based on [9] , [11] . We require that no enemy process may interfere on the server's costly events. This concept of interference is crucial in order to establish a causal dependency between the intruder's behaviors and the defender's behaviors : the occurrence of an high-cost actions must be a consequence of the intruder's actions, and not of some other protocol run, in order to conclude that there is indeed a DoS attack. 
. In this case, the relation, , used in Definition 4, requires that and . Consider , the specification of the SYN flooding attack shown in Fig. 9 . Note that it is sufficient to check INI for domains and , since they are the only domains that have noninterference requirements.
We proceed using Algorithm 1, and find that: 1) is -observable with respect to ; but 2) is not -observable with respect to . In particular, our analysis reveals that the traces and are the cause for failing to satisfy -observability with respect to . Indeed, and , with , but .
V. CONCLUSION
We studied a class of security problems in computer systems and protocols that can be characterized by the property of INI. Our objective is to obtain an efficient method to verify a necessary and sufficient condition for INI and, thus, solve an open problem in the security area. Our approach is algorithmic: we developed an algorithm based on automata representing the system/protocol behavior that can be used to derive a definite answer as to whether or not INI is satisfied. Our success in solving this otherwise difficult problem is partly due to the fact that we borrowed techniques from the theory of DES. In particular, we extended the notion of observability in DES to define a new -observability. It turns out that -observability is precisely the property we need to verify INI. We also applied our algorithm to the important problem of formalizing and checking denial of service attacks in protocols. His current research interests focus on the specification and validation of cryptographic protocols using process algebras and equivalence-checking proof methods. 
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